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Perspectives
Communicating with patients and the 
public about COVID- 19 vaccine safety: 
recommendations from the Collaboration on 
Social Science and Immunisation
Understanding the mental shortcuts people make and the values they bring to weighing risks 
is critical to informing effective risk communication
On 8 April 2021, the Australian Technical Advisory Group on Immunisation (ATAGI) made the Pfizer Comirnaty (BNT162b2[mRNA]) 
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID- 19) vaccine the 
preferred vaccine for adults aged under 50 years 
who have not received a first dose of the COVID- 19 
vaccine AstraZeneca (ChAdOx1- S).1 This followed 
an established causal relationship between the 
AstraZeneca vaccine and a rare clotting condition 
named “thrombosis with thrombocytopenia 
syndrome” (TTS).2 This decision has affected the 
COVID- 19 vaccine roll- out nationally, given Australia’s 
limited vaccine portfolio — the AstraZeneca vaccine 
is the mainstay for Australia’s supply with 53.8 
million doses secured, mostly through domestic 
production.3,4 ATAGI’s recommendation occurred 7 
weeks into a roll- out affected by limited global vaccine 
supply, difficulties in coordination between the 
Commonwealth and state and territory governments, 
and intense media attention. With a limited supply of 
Pfizer vaccine doses available until later in the year, 
the recommendation imposes a significant delay in the 
timeframe in which Australians could be protected 
from COVID- 19 and an ongoing vulnerability for the 
coming winter.
The risk– benefit analysis for the AstraZeneca vaccine 
is balanced between the risk of developing TTS and the 
benefit of preventing severe COVID- 19. The equation 
is mainly affected by the amount of disease in the 
community and age of potential vaccine recipients. 
Older people are at greater risk from COVID- 19, 
including intensive care unit admission and death. 
Rates of TTS are currently estimated to occur at 26 
cases per million in people aged under 50 years, 
reducing to 16 cases per million in those aged 50 
years and over.5 TTS is a serious adverse event that 
requires hospitalisation and has a death rate initially 
estimated at 25%.1 Earlier case ascertainment may see 
this death rate reduce. It is not possible to determine 
who is at greater risk of developing TTS and cases 
must be identified early to receive timely non- heparin 
anticoagulant therapy. Knowledge about TTS continues 
to evolve.
This article outlines the potential impacts of the 
AstraZeneca vaccine safety concerns. It considers the 
relevant heuristics and values affecting patient decision 
making and proposes some practical strategies for 
effective communication by clinicians and governments. 
The recommendations have been collaboratively 
developed by members of the Collaboration on Social 
Science and Immunisation (COSSI) steering group. 
COSSI is Australia’s leading network to inform 
immunisation policy and practice with high quality 
evidence from the social sciences. The authors reflect 
social science, clinical, Aboriginal, consumer and 
program perspectives. The steering group met on 
14 April 2021 to formulate a set of observations and 
recommendations. These were grounded in knowledge 
from the field of risk communication, a specific 
guidance on communicating about COVID- 19 vaccine 
safety from the World Health Organization,6 and our 
research in progress in Victoria, New South Wales and 
Western Australia examining public and professional 
attitudes to the COVID- 19 vaccines.
Impacts of the AstraZeneca vaccine 
recommendation
The ATAGI recommendation on the AstraZeneca 
vaccine poses significant risk communication 
challenges for clinicians and governments. Even 
small risks associated with the AstraZeneca vaccine 
may be hard to tolerate in a country with limited 
local transmission, yet an outbreak remains almost 
inevitable. So far in Australia, tracking surveys have 
detected little to no reduction in willingness to have 
a COVID- 19 vaccine.7,8 A decline in turnout observed 
among health care workers in NSW may reflect 
reduced confidence but also confusion and delay due 
to perceptions of vaccine availability.9
The impact of the perceived risk of TTS on younger 
women could be greater, given this group is already 
reported to be more hesitant about COVID- 19 
vaccination.10 Young women have been viewing media 
reports since the beginning of 2021 about their cohort’s 
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vaccine intentions, likely creating a vaccine hesitancy 
norm which may affect behaviour. Furthermore, 
recent evidence suggests that people who are hesitant 
about vaccination may also lack trust in providers and 
governments — the very same institutions providing 
vaccine advice.10
Given the current limited supply of vaccines in Australia, 
the impact on the estimated 24% of Australians unsure 
about having a COVID- 19 vaccine may not be fully seen 
until supply outstrips demand later in the year.11 Such 
longer term impacts on confidence were seen after the 4- 
month suspension of influenza vaccination for children 
aged less than 5 years in 2010, where it took nearly a 
decade for safety concerns to abate.12
Each age group may struggle to understand the 
risks and recommendations for COVID- 19 vaccines. 
Current information could turn into misinformation 
as it travels through different messengers.13 Given 
that people aged under 50 years can still agree to 
receive the AstraZeneca vaccine, they may seek a 
risk– benefit discussion with their doctor or other 
vaccination provider. Some people aged 50 years and 
over may wish to wait for the Pfizer vaccine later in the 
year, preferring to do nothing at present, despite the 
uncertainty around hotel quarantine and a possible 
increase in disease rates at any time.
Understanding and assessing risk
Understanding the mental shortcuts people make 
and the values they bring to weighing risks is critical 
to informing effective risk communication. People 
rely on heuristics to process risk information. These 
are mental shortcuts that allow them to make rapid 
judgements when dealing with large volumes of 
information.14 For example, people’s overestimation 
of low probability outcomes (“compression”) may 
make it difficult to give them a sense of scale when 
referring to a rare event such as TTS. Similarly, 
a serious but rare outcome, such as TTS, will be 
given more weighting if it is highly publicised 
(“availability”). Some people anticipate negative 
emotions because of a decision and thus avoid taking 
that course (“anticipated regret”), which may limit 
vaccine acceptance and affect a health care worker’s 
willingness to recommend the AstraZeneca vaccine. 
Relatedly, people may prefer to accept an outcome 
from doing nothing (not getting vaccinated) than 
an outcome from doing something (vaccinating; 
“omission bias”), and avoid taking risks when the 
outcome is uncertain (“ambiguity aversion”).
Heuristics are underscored by the values that affect 
how people think, feel and act on risk. Values 
relevant to vaccine decision making may include self- 
determination, fairness, minimising harm, and justice. 
For Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, there 
are community and family obligations that will affect 
decisions and actions.
Clinical communication
Health care workers, especially those in primary care, 
will have a major role in helping people assess their 
personal eligibility for a vaccine and weigh the risks 
and benefits.
Support valid consent
The presence of a rare but serious adverse event 
highlights the imperative to ensure valid consent for 
vaccination, defined in the Australian immunisation 
handbook as, “the voluntary agreement by an 
individual to a proposed procedure, which is given 
after sufficient, appropriate and reliable information 
about the procedure, including the potential risks 
and benefits”.15 ATAGI has developed guidelines and 
discussion resources for immunisation providers on 
agreeing consent for COVID- 19 vaccination.16
Help people weigh risk and benefit
To provide information on probabilities, risk 
comparisons have become common, such as comparing 
TTS risk with clots from the oral contraceptive pill, 
smoking, and with deep vein thrombosis from 
long- haul flights. We recommend that comparisons 
use risks and outcomes to help people understand 
magnitude, not to communicate the acceptability of 
a risk. The risks and their outcomes should also be 
similar.
Numerical risk formats enable a precise understanding 
of risk.17 Verbal formats should be added for people 
with limited numeracy. Visuals, such as with icon 
arrays, also help people understand risk and benefit, 
particularly those with low health  literacy or low 
English proficiency.18 The same denominator and time 
period should be used when comparing across risks; 
a smaller denominator makes the probability easier to 
understand.17
Since values and preferences are relevant to vaccine 
decisions, a health professional can elicit these as 
part of the weighing of vaccine risk and benefit using 
tools such as decision aids.18 When considering the 
benefits of vaccination, it may help to highlight the 
protection from vaccination for individuals and those 
around them, and to ask them what else they may 
value about being vaccinated.19 Knowing if others are 
being vaccinated also influences decisions.20 Finally, 
a recommendation from a health care worker is a 
highly effective form of vaccination encouragement 
but should come with respect for autonomy.20 The 
Box shows suggestions for structuring a vaccination 
conversation with a 55- year- old woman, for example, 
who has concerns about receiving the AstraZeneca 
vaccine.
Public risk communication
Communicate frequently about the process and 
outcomes
Governments should continue to communicate 
frequently and transparently. Ongoing policy 
decisions should involve a range of experts and 
stakeholders. Rationales should be clear. The 
ATAGI recommendation was timely and detailed; 
it included their various considerations, using 
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acknowledged inevitable trade- offs, such as an 
impact on confidence. The group includes consumer 
perspectives, which were actively sought throughout 
the process.
Make values explicit
We recommend that public communication is explicit 
about values, particularly when decisions are made 
about the acceptability of a risk to one’s health, 
family, and social and economic life.22 It is vital that 
consumers are involved in decision processes and 
communication planning, as this helps ensure that 
decisions and messages are relevant and conversant 
with community values.
Use clear, accurate, actionable messages
Confusion among patients and providers is likely, 
owing to the complexity, nuance and dynamism 
of the changes; for example, misconstruing what 
“preferred” and “not recommended” mean (neither 
means the AstraZeneca vaccine is banned for 
people aged under 50 years), or uncertainty about 
appropriate consenting processes for individuals 
aged less than 50 years who choose the AstraZeneca 
vaccine. This will be intensified for key groups where 
information may not be tailored. Communicators 
announcing new risk information should inform 
audiences what it means for them and how they 
should respond. Messages should be developed with 
health literacy in mind and pre- tested to ensure 
they are understood and salient. Governments 
should continue to inform people about the vaccine 
recommendations over time — previous safety- 
related program changes showed that an ongoing 
deficit of information contributed to persistent 
vaccine ambivalence.23
Promote vaccination but do not over- reassure
Highlight the benefits of vaccination that are relevant 
to people and resonate with their values, even in the 
context of low disease transmission. However, avoid 
over- reassuring people about vaccine safety with 
statements such as “the vaccine is safe for people 
over 50 years”. Early overconfidence in rates of an 
outcome may also affect trust if data change. Signal the 
potential for estimates to be updated over time so the 
public are more ready for change.
Diversify communication channels and platforms
Research interviewees have told us they do not know 
where to look for reliable information that answers 
their specific questions. Multiple channels should be 
used and government information should be easy to 
access without having to search around. Many people 
rely on social media and messaging smartphone 
applications such as WhatsApp, but different 
platforms are preferred depending on age and 
cultural background. Television and radio, including 
community programming in different languages, 
are also important avenues for communication. The 
Commonwealth, state and territory governments 
should enable local public health entities to 
communicate with their own communities about 
vaccination so it is appropriately tailored.
Identify and address misinformation
Information about the vaccination program may 
become rumour and misinformation as it spreads 
through the community. Some of our research 
participants have shared vaccination myths that 
contribute to their hesitancy. Proactively debunk myths 
that are spreading widely or affecting behaviour.24
Suggested structure when a patient is hesitant about vaccination, applied to a 55-year-old woman concerned about 
whether to have the AstraZeneca vaccine (ChAdOx1- S) for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID- 19)*
Communication practice Example




“It’s understandable that you have some concerns.”
Set brief agenda “Let’s go through that concern about the clotting risk for you and also the possible benefits 
of having the vaccine soon. How does that sound?”
Share knowledge “Can I share what I know so far? The risk from the vaccine is small — it may affect 16 people 
in every million in your age group. It can be quite serious if not treated early. Here is some 
information showing the risks of the rare blood clotting syndrome alongside the risks of 
going to the ICU with COVID- 19. I also have some information about what to look out for. 
This may help your decision.”
Elicit potential motivation to vaccinate “What might be important to you about having the vaccine now?”
Set out options, share tailored 
recommendation
“So if I could summarise, your options are to not vaccinate, to wait for Pfizer vaccine doses to 
be available later on, or to have the AstraZeneca vaccine right now. There are pros and cons 
of each option. Having looked at all the considerations, where are you leaning?”
“I will respect whatever decision you make. I would like to see you get vaccinated sooner 
rather than later.”
Continue the conversation “If there is an outbreak, the risk from COVID- 19 is increased. Could we revisit your decision 
then?”















Priortise key groups for communication
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people may 
value the opportunity to ask questions and have 
discussions rather than fit the characterisation of 
being hesitant. Consider the information needs of 
different health care worker groups as well. Vaccine 
providers need support and information to respond 
to queries, but other health care workers will also face 
questions and may not know how to respond. Health 
care workers considering vaccination for themselves 
are a key group since they may be more vulnerable to 
COVID- 19, at risk of transmission, recommending the 
vaccine to their patients and are also trusted in their 
families and communities for health advice.
Use credible spokespeople
We recommend that public health, vaccinology, or 
medical professionals are the preferred voices to 
communicate about vaccine safety issues rather than 
politicians. Preliminary data from our research in 
Victoria and Western Australia showed that health 
professionals and advisory bodies are trusted more than 
politicians when discussing adverse events following 
immunisation that affect peoples’ health. Both health 
care workers and members of the public prioritised in 
phases 1a and 1b preferred to hear information about 
vaccines from medical and scientific professionals.25 
Trusted spokespersons should spend time engaging 
with the community — attending community forums 
and answering questions to break down the gap 
between technical experts and the community. For 
people from culturally and linguistically diverse 
(CALD) communities, our national research suggests 
that CALD health professionals be the spokespeople, 
or that non- CALD health professionals partner with 
community and faith- based leaders.
Sustain trust
Trust in the Australian Government can directly 
affect trust in the vaccine program.10 Transparency 
and demonstrated efforts to work across the aisle will 
help to maintain and rebuild trust. The government’s 
decision to assemble the National Cabinet for more 
regular meetings was a positive move towards a more 
unified response.
Use data to inform action
Public responses to vaccine safety issues can 
sometimes rely on anecdotes about impact and 
lack data to inform communication and planning. 
Data showing a decline in vaccination coverage do 
not disentangle the reasons for it to occur. While 
confidence in vaccine safety will inevitably be reduced 
in some people, others may face difficulty with 
booking an appointment or with perceived availability 
of the vaccine. A sole focus on hesitancy alone may 
come at the expense of understanding and addressing 
other barriers to vaccination.
Monitor and evaluate
It is impossible to know if communication is effective 
unless it is evaluated. Mechanisms for monitoring 
public responses to information and barriers to 
vaccination can include reviews of hotline questions, 
social media listening, search analytics, pulse surveys, 
and qualitative research.
Conclusion
Achieving high COVID- 19 vaccine coverage will be a 
significant challenge given Australia’s supply, access 
and hesitancy challenges. Good risk communication 
and support for providers and the public to make 
decisions about vaccination are essential as we can 
work towards protecting all Australians, opening 
our borders, and continuing to live optimally with 
COVID- 19.
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